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??Epistemic Conditionals
The purpose of this paper is to elucidate semantico-
pragmatic properties of conditionals like these :
?1? a. If Mary typed his thesis, she loves him.
b. ‘If the sightings are real,’ Voyles said quietly in
Tarrance’s face, ‘we’re wasting our time here.’
J. Grisham The Firm
c. Things were getting serious. If Evans identified
Mrs Templeton and Mrs Nicholson as one and the
same person matters were going to become diffi-
cult.
A. Christie Why Didn’t They Ask Evans?
Sweetser ?1990? refers to sentences like these as
epistemic conditionals. They differ from the following
sentences, which she calls content conditionals, in some
essential respects :
?2? a. If Mary loves him, she will type his thesis.
b. If light cannot escape from an object, this object
appears black from the outside. Hence the name
“black hole.”
c. If I went to a new place I was with Frans or my
mother or father and felt no threat.
T. Chevalier Girl With A Pearl Earring
While content conditionals represent the causal links be-
tween situations at the content level, epistemic condi-
tionals are concerned with the validity of inferential
reasoning processes involving both the propositions ex-
pressed in the protases and those expressed in the
apodoses.
For example, conditional ?1a? expresses the idea that,
whenever a speaker knows that Mary typed his thesis,
that speaker concludes that she loves him. In other
words, in ?1a?, the knowledge of the truth of the premise
proposition expressed in the protasis is a precondition
for concluding the truth of the proposition expressed in
the apodosis? the knowledge causes the conclusion.
Thus, unlike a content conditional, the connecting link in
?1a? is between the epistemic states or situations. Also
the linking relation in ?1a? appears to be in the reverse
direction ; the state of affairs described in the apodosis is
causally prior to that described in the protasis. This is
contrasted with the causal relation in ?2a?, where the
loving is a precondition for the typing.
If-clauses in epistemic conditionals are both syntacti-
cally and semantically fairly independent of their matrix
clauses. To begin with, they can have the independent or
deictic tense, as shown in :
?i? Deictic present tense :
?3? a. If you’ve been travelling all night, you probably
need a rest.
Hornby ?1975 : 229?
b. If it is raining ?now?, the lawn will be too wet to
play on this afternoon.
Haegeman ?1983 : 147?
c. ‘Forgery,’ said Frankie thoughtfully. ‘That letter
from you, Bobby, was remarkably well done. I
wonder how he knew your handwriting?’
‘If he’s in with the Caymans he probably saw my let-
ter about the Evans business.’
A. Christie Why Didn’t They Ask Evans?
?ii? Deictic past tense ?Hornby ?1975 : 229230?:
?4? a. If he arrived only yesterday, he’s unlikely to leave
today.
b. If that was what he told you he was telling lies.
c. If she promised to be here she’ll certainly come.
?iii?Deictic future tense :
?5? a. If Claude will be here tomorrow, there’s no need
to call him now.
Declerck ?1984 : 286?
b. If the camp will start soon, it will enjoy some good
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weather.
Haegeman ?1983 : 153?
c. They’ve done a murder and got away with it. But
if it’s all going to be raked up again now, it’s the
woman will give the show away.
A. Christie And Then There Were None
There is also a difference in the distribution of pro-
nouns and coreferent noun phrases in if-clauses of the
two types, as in : ?See Haegeman and Wekker ?1984??
?6? a. John will learn all about wine if he /*John goes to
France.
b. John should know all about wine, if he / John was
in France last year.
The noun phrase John in the epistemic-type if-clause can
be coreferential with the preceding John in the main
clause, while the noun phrase in the content-type if-
clause cannot be interpreted in this way.
Finally, as Fintel and Iatridou ?2002? point out, quanti-
fiers cannot bind pronouns in epistemic conditionals like
those in ?7?:
?7? a. If John’s light is on, he is home.
b. John is home, if his light is on.
This restriction is shown by the fact that the structure
?8?, where every is intended to bind the pronoun his, is
ungrammatical :
?8? *Every studentx is home if hisx light is on.
The reason for the ungrammaticality, they claim, is that
the quantifier cannot scope over the epistemic operator.
To illustrate this, consider the following clearer case :
?9? *Every studentx must be home if hisx light is on.
The structure ?9?, which contains the overt epistemic
operator must, is ungrammatical because the quantifier
every ?student? has scope over the modal operator must :
every  must. It is thus claimed that just as in the case
of ?9?, sentence ?8? has a structure where the quantifier
of its main clause has scope over the covert epistemic
operator. The reason why the quantifier can have a
wider scope is that the epistemic operator’s scope is con-
fined to the main clause, but not to the whole conditional.
Consider the following example :
?10? If the light is on, John must be home.
?11? a. If the light is on, MUST ? John is home?.
b. MUST ?If the light is on, John is home?.
The operator must in ?10? has scope only over the main
clause as in ?11a?, rather than over the whole sentence
as in ?11b?.
The peculiar behavior of epistemic conditionals re-
flects the fact that the grammatical mechanism utilizes
peculiar pragmatic or semantic tools for their construc-
tion. In the following two sections, I will investigate how
the mechanism works in the use of those conditionals.
??Echoic Uses in Epistemic Conditionals
As Declerck and Reed ?2001? point out, protases in
epistemic conditionals are ‘always echoic in one sense or
another.’ Consider :
?12? a. ‘. . . She thinks he’s in love with Sylvia. Well, as
to that, of course, I can’t say.’
‘If she thinks so, she’s probably right,’ inter-
rupted Frankie.
‘A woman would know all right about her own
husband.’
A. Christie Why Didn’t They Ask Evans?
b. “But the door was locked?yes. But there is
nothing to show if it were locked from the inside
or the outside. You see, the key was missing.”
“But then?if it is missing. . . .” She took a min-
ute or two. “Then it must have been locked
from the outside. Otherwise it would be some-
where in the room.”
A. Christie Murder in the Mews
In ?12?, the protases ‘she thinks so’ and ‘it is missing’
echo the preceding statements ‘She thinks he’s in love
with Sylvia.’ and ‘. . , the key was missing.’ respectively.
Declerck and Reed ?2001 : 83? further say that protasis
clauses ‘may also be echoes of an internal or mental
proposition.’ For example :
?13? ?watching the clock? If it’s a already 8.45, I’d better
hurry up.
Declerck and Reed also claim that the speaker takes it
for granted that the fulfillment of the condition expressed
in a if-clause is a fact, that is, ?though not necessarily
committed to its truth? she is willing to assume the con-
dition as true1?. Therefore the echoes in ?12? and ?13?
are not the same as reporting utterances like that in
?14?:
?14? Mary : What did John say?
Joan : “I’m a nice person.”
In reporting John’s utterance, Joan does not express any
?????? ??? ????? ??????????
attitude toward the truth of what he said. By contrast, the
speakers in ?12? and ?13? assume some attitude toward
the truth of the protasis clauses being echoed2?. In other
words, the echoed protases are playing a dual role in the
sense that the speaker does not only echo someone
else’s or their own utterance or statement, but also ex-
press some epistemic attitude toward the echoed propo-
sitions. In this respect, they are similar to repeated ut-
terances. Consider :
?15? Foley : . . . You better stop eye-ballin’ me boy!
You’re not worthy enough to look your su-
periors in the eye ! Understand?
Perryman : Yes, sir.
Foley : Now, every time I say, “Understand?” I
want the whole group to say, “Yes, sir !”
Understand? ?The underline is mine.?
Group : Yes, sir!
Foley : ? yells? Understand?
Group : ?shouts? Yes, sir!
From the movie An Officer and a Gentleman
In his underlined utterance ‘Understand?’ Foley is re-
peating his preceding utterance and, at the same time,
asking the group whether they understand what he says.
In the next example, the captain recites the pledge for a
commencement as all the class raises their hands and re-
peat after him:
?16? Captain : Class Fifteen Eighty-One, raise your
right hand and repeat after me.
I do solemnly swear. . .
Class : I do solemnly swear. . .
Captain : . . . that I will support and defend the Con-
stitution of the United States of America. . .
Class : . . . that I will support and defend the Consti-
tution of the United States of America. . .
ibid.
The captain’s original utterance is just demonstrating a
specimen of a pledge and does not perform any illocu-
tionary act of pledging. Yet the class are not only mim-
icking his utterance, but also performing a genuine
pledge. In the following example, the repeated utterance
is assertive :
?17? And he went back to meet the fox.
‘Good-bye,’ he said.
‘Good-bye,’ said the fox. ‘And now here is my se-
cret, a very simple secret : It is only with the heart
that one can see rightly ; what is essential is invisi-
ble to the eye.’
‘What is essential is invisible to the eye,’ the little
prince repeated, so that he would be sure to re-
member.
A. de Saint-The Little Prince Tr. by K. Woods
In repeating the fox’s utterance, ‘what is essential is in-
visible to the eye,’ the prince performs an assertive
speech act, committed to the truth of the proposition it
expresses.
Both the echoed protases and repeated utterances are
of the use of quotation that Recanati calls a hybrid. Con-
sider :
?18? That boy is really ‘smart’.
The speaker of ?18? uses the word smart ‘while at the
same time implicitly ascribing that use to some other
person . . . whose usage ?she? is blatantly echoing or
mimicking3?.’ Thus utterance ?18? entails the following
obtained by removing the quotation marks :
?19? That boy is really smart.
In ?18?, the quotation is local and only the limited por-
tion of the utterance is quoted. In the cases of ?12?,
?13?, ?15?, ?16? and ?17?, however, the quotation has
the whole utterance within its scope and the whole sen-
tence is used to depict another usage while doing its nor-
mal semantic work.
??Closed Quotations in Epistemic Conditionals
Recanati ?2001? differentiates between two types of
quotation : the open and closed type. Let us look at his
examples :
?20? Stop that John! ‘Nobody likes me’, ‘I am miserable’
. . . Don’t you think you exaggerates a bit?
?21? John keeps crying and saying ‘Nobody like me’.
In ?20?, quotations ‘Nobody likes me’ occurs on its own,
not as part of a construction. In ?21?, it fills a slot in the
sentence ‘John keeps crying and saying ’ and serves
as a singular term. Recanati says that the former is open
and, by contrast, the latter is closed.
The echoed clause ‘the light is on’ in epistemic condi-
tional ?10?, repeated here for convenience, seems to be
closed ; it fills a slot in the conditional ‘If , John must
be home’, though it may not serve as a singular term:
?10? If the light is on, John must be home.
Nobuo Nakashima : Inference and Epistemic Conditionals ???
Namely we may say that the protasis clause is quoted, as
in :
?22? If ‘the light is on’, John must be home.
To make it clear how the quoter is related to the quoted
clause in ?22?, consider the example Noh ?2000 : 19?
gives as a mixed quotation :
?23? The teacher said, “I will use ‘the rod of love’ to
make you learn better.”
In the direct speech ?23?, the speaker reports what the
teacher, say Mary, uttered, i.e., “I will use . . . you learn
better.” In that quoted utterance, she used the words the
rod of love and, at the same time, may have quoted them.
Thus the phrase the rod of love is doubly quoted, that is,
by Mary and then by the speaker of ?23?. Next consider :
?24? a. I said, “I will use ‘the rod of love’ to make you
learn better.”
b. Honestly ?I say?, “I will use ‘the rod of love’ to
make you learn better.”
In ?24a?, Mary herself reports her past utterance, in
which she quoted the phrase the rod of love. In ?24b?, in
uttering the reporting sentence Honestly ?I say?. . . , she
utters the reported sentence I will use the rod of love to
. . . , where she quotes that phrase. Notice here that in
?24b?, Mary does not just report the utterance “I will
use . . . ,” but performs a genuine speech act of, say,
warning.
Further consider :
?25? Honestly ?I say?, “ ‘What is essential is invisible to
the eye.’ ”
In ?25?, the utterance “ ‘What is essential is . . .’ ” is dou-
bly quoted as a whole ; in uttering the sentence Honestly
?I say?, the speaker, say, the prince, reports and echoes
that utterance simultaneously. In ?10?, I claim, the same
thing happens to the conditional and its protasis.
?26? If “ ‘the light is on’ ”, John must be home.
In uttering the conditional ‘If , John must be home,’
the speaker quotes the utterance ‘the light is on,’ which
fills the slot, and, at the same time, echoes some other
utterance. Furthermore, I claim that the apodosis in
?26? is quoted in the sense that the utterance modified
by the speech act adverb honestly in ?27a? is interpreted
as a reporting speech of a sort, as in ?27b?:
?27? a. Honestly, what is essential is invisible to the
eye.
b. Honestly I say, “What is essential is invisible to
the eye.”
Namely, the main clause of ?10? is used and, at the same
time, quoted to stand for the type which its utterance
instantiates. If I am right, conditional ?10? is constructed
by filling the two slots of ‘If , then .’ and inter-
preted as :
?28? If “ ‘the light is on’ ”, “ ‘John must be home’ ”.
More precisely, following Recanati ?2001?, the slots are
filled by the occurrences of ‘Dem?onstration?’, an iconic
symbol ; and those occurrences refer to the quoted mate-
rials or the utterance types, which are not semantically
parts of the conditional in which they are presented.
This is illustrated, as in :
?29? If ?Dem?
?
, then ?Dem?
?
.
‘the light is on’ ‘John must be home’
My claim is indirectly supported by the peculiar behav-
iors of epistemic conditionals concerning pronominaliza-
tion and modality, which are mentioned in section 1. In
the case of an epistemic conditional, an antecedent noun
phrase in the apodosis clause does not bind a pronoun in
the protasis clause; and the modal operator in the
apodosis does not have scope over the whole conditional.
This means that the utterance of the apodosis, rather
than that of the whole conditional, is committed to the
truth of its own propositional content.
To sum up, in uttering an epistemic conditional, the
speaker expresses her attitude toward the truth of the
three propositional contents, i.e., that of the if-clause, the
main clause and the whole conditional. First she as-
sumes the protasis as true and then, under that assump-
tion, infers the truth of the apodosis ; and finally she as-
serts the truth of an inferential relationship between
them4?.
??Speaker’s Epistemic Situations in Epistemic
Conditionals
A sentence has two meanings : propositional and atti-
tudinal. The propositional meaning of a sentence is an
objective description of a situation that the speaker is
supposed to focus on in uttering it ; and the attitudinal
meaning is her attitude toward the truth of that
propositional meaning. Consider :
?30? John is smart.
The propositional meaning of this sentence is a type of
?????? ??? ????? ??????????
situation whose instance situation supports a state of af-
fairs in which John is smart. The type is represented
as :
?31? smart, j
When the utterance of ?30? carries true information,
there exists a situation s in which John’s smartness is ac-
tualized, as shown in :
?32? ssmart, j
The attitudinal meaning of ?30?, which reflects a modal
aspect of its meaning, is a type of epistemic situation
whose instance situation supports the speaker’s belief at-
titude, as in :
?33? Truessmart, j
When a speaker, say, Mary, utters sentence ?30?, the
state of affairs, Ture, ssmart, j, is realized in
her epistemic situation at that utterance, i.e., em. This is
shown as in5?:
?34? emTruessmart, j
?The superscript of an epistemic-situation symbol will be
omitted, unless necessary.?
According to situation semantics, a conditional repre-
sents a general relationship between the two situation
types respectively represented by its protasis and
apodosis. Consider :
?35? If Mary goes, John will go.
This content conditional represents the relationship be-
tween the Mary-going type and the John-going type, as
in6?:
?36? ssgoing, m	 ssgoing, j
This relationship is actualized by a channel situation c, as
in :
?37? cssgoing, m	 ssgoing, j
The channel c defines the relation  that connects
Mary-going situations to John-going situations and so
?37? can be rephrased as :
?38? 
s, tsgoing, m s, t
  going, j
Since conditional ?35? is a indicative sentence, its attitu-
dinal meaning is like this :
?39? eeTrue, cT1 	 T2
T1ssgoing, m
T2ssgoing, j
When some speaker, say Joan, utters ?35?, her epistemic
situation e instantiates this epistemic situation type, as
in :
?40? eTruecT1 	 T2
Next consider epistemic conditional ?10?, repeated
here for convenience :
?10? If the lights are on, John is home.
As we saw in the previous section, the utterances of the
protasis and apodosis are demonstrations and they are
doubly quoted, as in :
?41? If “ ‘the lights are on’,” “ ‘John is home’.”
In uttering ?41?, the speaker does not only mention the
protasis and apodosis, but also use them to express her
belief attitudes toward their truth. Thus her attitudes are
realized in epistemic situations e1 and e2, as in :
?42? a. e1TruesOn, lgt
b. e2Trueshome, j
Conditional ?10? represents, as a whole, the relationship
between the two epistemic situation types referred to by
the demonstrations of the protasis and apodosis, which
means that the two types which the epistemic situations
e1 and e2 instantiate constitutes that type relationship, as
in7?:
?43? eeTrue	 eeTrue
sOn, lgt
shome, j
In the utterance of ?41?, this propositional meaning of
?10? is instantiated by channel situation c, as shown in :
?44? ceeTrue	 eeTrue
 
ee’ eTrue e, e’
 e’True
Furthermore, the speaker expresses her attitude toward
the truth of the propositional meaning, as in :
?45? e0TruecT1 	 T2
T1e1True
T2e2True
So the attitudinal meaning of ?10? is the type of
epistemic situation e0 :
?46? eeTruecT1 	 T2
T1e1True
T2e2True
In summing up, there are three epistemic situations
e0, e1, and e2 in the utterance of epistemic conditional
?10?:
?47? ?e0TruecT1 	 T2
?e1True
?e2True
In e1, the speaker takes it for granted that is true ; so
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in e2 , she concludes that is also true ; and at the same
time, she is committed to the truth about the inferential
relationship between and or of the claim that fol-
lows .
Before leaving this section, a few words are in order
about modality in epistemic conditionals. Their apodoses
often contain modal auxiliaries or modal adverbs :
?48? a. Herb : Frank tells me you’re a singer.
Rachel : Yeah, that’s right.
Herb : Yeah, well, uh, we’re are kinda out of
things up her. I’m sorry.
Rachel : Well, that’s okay.
Herb : You must be very successful if you need
someone like Frank.
From the movie The Bodyguard
b. “But the door was locked?yes. But there is
nothing to show if it were locked from the inside
or the outside. You see, the key was missing.”
“But then?if it is missing. . . .” She took a min-
ute or two. “Then it must have been locked
from the outside. Otherwise it would be some-
where in the room.”
A. Christie Murder in the Mews
c. Frank : She’s out to kill you.
Andrew: My dear Hunter, if that was indeed her
purpose, you should know by now that
she fulfilled it long ago.
T. Rattigan The Browning Version
?49? If he’s in with the Caymans he probably saw my
letter about the Evans business.
A. Christie Why Didn’t They Ask Evans?
They also contain the semi-modal seem or propositional-
attitude expressions8?:
?50? a. Alex Pritchard, or Alan Carstairs, must have
been murdered. If he wasn’t there seems no
point in the attack upon Jones.
A. Christie Why Didn’t They Ask Evans?
b In fact, Bobby reflected, if she had not recog-
nized her own photograph, it seemed doubtful if
anyone else would have done so.
?=If she did not recognized her own photograph,
it seems doubtful if anyone else will have done
so.?
A. Christie Why Didn’t They Ask Evans?
?51? a. ‘If Dr Nicholson is so fond of children I suppose
he came to your children’s party?’ said Frankie
carelessly.
‘Unfortunately he was away for a day or two just
then. I think he had to go to London for some
conference.’
A. Christie Why Didn’t They Ask Evans?
b. If in fact McDeere met with the Fibbies up there
and failed to report it, then I’m sure Lazarov will
instruct me to move quickly.
J. Grisham The Firm
In some cases, a protasis contains a modal expression
?See Declerck and Reed ?2001 : 8889?:
?52? If he ?is probably / may perhaps be? a paedophile,
we’d better keep the children away from him.
The modal parts in these examples can be made explicit
by the following paraphrases :
?53? a. It must be true that you are very successful.
b. It must be true that it was locked from the in-
side.
c. It should be true that you know by now that she
fulfilled it long ago.
d. It is probably true that he saw my letter about
the Evans business.
e. It seems that there is no point in the attack upon
Jones.
f. It seems doubtless if anyone else did so. ?=It
seems that no one else did so.?
g. I suppose that he had to go to London for some
conference.
h. I am sure that Lazarov will instruct me to move
quickly.
i. It is probably / may perhaps be true that he is a
paedophile.
These epistemic expressions are used performatively ;
and the situations in which epistemic judgments are per-
formed by them are represented as ‘eTrue’, just
as the judgment performed by the phrase it is true ?that?
is. The differences in epistemic value between the modal
parts may be expressed by some other situations, say
‘sMust, e’ or ‘sProbable, e’.
??Inferential Processes
Copi ?1972 : 5? says, “Inference is a process by which
one proposition is reached and affirmed on the basis of
?????? ??? ????? ??????????
one or more other propositions accepted as the starting
point of the process.” Sweetser ?1990 : 116? claims that
an epistemic conditional expresses such an inferential
process: “In the epistemic domain, if-then conjunction
expresses the idea that knowledge of the truth of the hy-
pothetical premise expressed in the protasis would be a
sufficient condition for concluding the truth of the propo-
sition expressed in the apodosis.” Declerck and Reed
?2001 : 42? also make a similar remark : “These
?=Epistemic conditionals? are conditionals that repre-
sent a process of reasoning of the type ‘If P is true, Q is
true’ in which the P-clause is ‘premise-expressing’ and
the Q-clause asserts the conclusion which the speaker
draws from P.”
Whitehead and Russell ?1910 : 7? remarked that in
common usage, the process of inference is often con-
fused with ‘implication’ expressed in an epistemic condi-
tional and explained it as follows :
The process of inference is as follows : a proposition
“” is asserted, and a proposition “implies ” is as-
serted, and then as a sequel the proposition “” is as-
serted. The trust in inference is the belief that if they
two former assertions are not in error, the final asser-
tion is not in error. Accordingly whenever, in symbols,
where and have of course special determinations,
“?” and “?”
have occurred, the “?” will occur if it is desired to
put it on record. The process of the inference cannot
be reduced to symbols. Its sole record is the occur-
rence of “?.”
Whitehead and Russell ?1910 : 89?
Namely the inferential process consists of the three
stages : “?”, “?” and “?”. We often express
an inferential relation like this by connecting two sen-
tences with the conjunctive word therefore or so, as in :
?54? These are his footprints, therefore / so he’s been
here recently.
Thus they continued :
It is of course convenient, even at the risk of repeti-
tion, to write “?” and “?” in close juxtaposi-
tion before proceeding to “?” as the result of an in-
ference. When this is to be done, for the sake of
drawing attention to the inference which is being
made, we shall write instead
“??”
which is to be considered as a mere abbreviation of the
threefold statement
“?” and “?” and “?.”
Thus “??” may be read “, therefore,” being
in fact the same abbreviation, essentially, as this is ; for
“, therefore ” does not explicitly state, what is part
of its meaning, that implies . An inference is the
dropping of a true premiss ; it is the dissolution of an
implication.
ibid.
Is an epistemic conditional an abbreviation of the three-
stage inferential relationship? The answer is no. It may
be similar to “??”, but it is not an abbreviated
form like “, therefore .” To utter “, therefore ” is
just to assert an inferential relationship between the two
propositions and .
By contrast, to utter an epistemic conditional ?If “‘’”,
then “‘’”? is to perform an inferential act?reasoning
from premise to conclusion 9?. This means that the
utterance includes the three assertions “?” and “?
” and “?” ; that is, the utterance “‘’” makes an
assertion “?” and at the same time demonstrates its
type ; the utterance “?” also asserts “?” and dem-
onstrates its type ; and the utterance of the whole clause
“If . . . , then . . . .” asserts an implication “implies ”?
“??.”
??Conclusion
An epistemic conditional contains the two doubly
quoted clauses? the protasis and apodosis, and ex-
presses a relationship between the two epistemic situa-
tion types respectively represented by the clauses. In ut-
tering the conditional, the speaker actually performs an
act of reasoning?drawing a conclusion from a premise.
More specifically, she asserts the protasis as a premise
and the inferential relationship and, under this assump-
tion, also asserts the apodosis as a conclusion ; and she
performs these three acts simultaneously.
Notes
1? Declerck ?1984 : 286? remarks that in an epistemic
conditional, the meaning of the if-clause comes very
close to that of an as- or since-clause.
2? Declerck ?1984 : 285286? points out that in ?i? and
?ii?, where the protases are echoed, ‘the meaning of if
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comes very close to that as as or since’:
i. If he won’t arrive before nine, there’s no point in or-
dering dinner for him.
ii. If the lava will come down as far as this, we must
evacuate these houses immediately.
3? For details of a hybrid use, see Recanati ?2000 : 139
140? and ?2001?.
4? As Declerck and Reed ?2001 : 285? point out, if-
clauses ‘express the most relevant rather than the only
premise underlying the inferential reasoning process.’
Barwise ?1989, Ch. 5? discussed formal treatment of im-
plicit premises that are pragmatically presupposed and so
not considered to be worth mentioning in the ordinary
use of conditionals.
5? For details about epistemic judgment and its situa-
tions, see Nakashima ?2007?.
6? For the treatment of conditionals in situation seman-
tics, see Nakashima ?2006?.
7? Epistemic conditional ?10? can be paraphrased with
the predicate true, as in :
i. If it is true that the lights are on, it is true that John
is home.
In a case like this, the phrase it is true ?that? is used
performatively, rather than descriptively.
8? As Dancygier ?1998 : 88? points out, the link between
the if-clause and the main clause is sometimes expressed
by the phrase ?then? it means that, as in :
i. If he is the villain of the piece, as we decided he must
be, it means that we’re going to show him our hand.
A. Christie Why Didn’t They Ask Evans?
My guess is that even in cases like this, the clause is
doubly quoted, as in :
If he is . . . , it means that “‘we’re going to show him our
hand’”.
9? Dancyngier and Sweetser ?2005 : 117? also claim that
what the speaker is involved in is ‘neither a prediction
about a conclusion to be drawn nor a description of a gen-
eral relation between premise and conclusion, but a
performative act of reasoning aloud.’ However they do
not explain how she performs such a reasoning act in ut-
tering a epistemic conditional.
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